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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
 
RAMIREZ V. STATE: WHEN A PETITIONER ALLEGES 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO COUNSEL’S 
FAILURE TO UNSEAT A JUROR, HE MUST PROVE NOT ONLY 
THAT COUNSEL’S PERFORMANCE WAS DEFICIENT, BUT ALSO 
THAT SAID PERFORMANCE PREJUDICED THE OUTCOME OF 
THE CASE. 
 
By: Eunice Ahaghotu 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that when a petitioner makes a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to unseat 
a juror, the petitioner still has the burden to prove both deficient performance 
and prejudice.  Ramirez v. State, 464 Md. 532, 541, 212 A.3d 363, 369 (2019).  
The court further held that a post-conviction allegation that counsel’s 
performance resulted in structural error would not relieve a petitioner of its 
burden to prove prejudice. Id. at 541, 212 A.3d at 368.  A presumption of 
prejudice should only be applied where the petitioner was actually denied 
assistance of counsel, constructively denied assistance of counsel, or 
petitioner’s counsel had an actual conflict of interest.  Id. at 541,212 A.3d at 
369.  The court went on to explain that where the State has presented strong 
evidence of a petitioner’s guilt, he generally will fail to prove that trial 
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him.  Id. at 577, 212 A.3d 390.   
     Edinson Herrera Ramirez (“Ramirez”) was arrested and charged with 
eleven crimes in association with an armed robbery.  Ramirez, 464 Md. at 
539, 212 A.3d at 368.  During voir dire, the Circuit Court for Carroll County 
asked all prospective jurors if they or any members of their families or close 
friends had ever been victims of a crime, accused of a crime, or witnesses in 
a criminal case, and if so, would that experience affect their ability to render 
a fair and impartial verdict.  Id. at 539-40, 212 A.3d at 368.  Juror 27 
responded that their apartment was broken into and that this experience 
would affect their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict.  Id. at 540, 
212 A.3d at 368.  Ramirez’s counsel did not ask Juror 27 any follow-up 
questions, ask that the circuit court do so, move to strike Juror 27 for cause, 
or use a peremptory challenge.  Id. at 540, 212 A.3d at 368.  Counsel did, 
however, move to strike the wrong juror, Juror 25, for the response given by 
Juror 27 to the crime victim question.  Id. at 540, 212 A.3d at 368.  At trial, 
the State presented overwhelming evidence of Ramirez’s guilt, including 
testimony and multiple pieces of physical evidence.  Ramirez, 464 Md. at 
579-80, 212 A.3d at 391.  Ramirez was subsequently found guilty of all 
eleven counts.  Id. at 540, 212 A.3d at 368.   
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    Ramirez petitioned for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to move to strike Juror 27, and 
failure to exercise a peremptory challenge.  Ramirez, 464 Md. at 540, 212 
A.3d at 368.  The circuit court denied Ramirez’s petition.  Id. at 540, 212 
A.3d at 368.  Ramirez then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, which affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.  Id. at 541, 212 A.3d 
at 368.  The Court of Special Appeals determined that even if trial counsel’s 
performance was deficient, a presumption of prejudice did not apply, and 
Ramirez failed to prove prejudice.  Id. at 557-58, 212 A.3d at 378.  Thus, he 
had failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel and was not entitled to 
post-conviction relief.  Id. at 558, 212 A.3d at 378.   
     Ramirez then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland granted the petition.  Ramirez, 464 Md. at 559, 212 A.3d at 379.  
Specifically, the Court of Appeals was asked to determine whether counsel’s 
performance was deficient and, if so, whether a presumption of prejudice 
should apply.  Id. at 539, 212 A.3d at 368.  Alternatively, the court was asked 
to determine whether Ramirez had the burden to prove prejudice where he 
alleged that trial counsel’s performance resulted in structural error.  Id. at 539, 
212 A.3d at 368.  The court evaluated Ramirez’s claim under the test set out 
by the Supreme Court for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 
560, 212 A.3d at 380 (citing Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 356, 166 A.3d 1, 
9 (2017)).  To prevail, a petitioner must meet two prongs: the performance 
prong and the prejudice prong.  Id. at 560, 212 A.3d at 380.  
     In order to satisfy the performance prong, it must be shown that “counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness… under 
prevailing professional norms.”  Ramirez, 464 Md. at 561, 212 A.3d at 380 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. 
Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).  The prejudice prong requires that “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Id. at 561, 212 A.3d at 380.  A court 
must hear the totality of the evidence before the jury.  Id. at 562, 212 A.3d at 
381.  A verdict that is overwhelmingly supported by the evidence is less likely 
to satisfy the prejudice prong.  Id. at 562, 212 A.3d at 381.  Prejudice will 
only be presumed during three limited circumstances where (1) petitioner was 
actually denied the assistance of counsel; (2) petitioner was constructively 
denied the assistance of counsel; or (3) petitioner’s counsel had an actual 
conflict of interest.  Id. at 541, 212 A.3d at 369.   
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland determined that Ramirez met his 
burden to prove that counsel was deficient.  Ramirez, 464 Md. at 566, 212 
A.3d at 384.  The court opined that no “reasonable lawyer” in counsel’s 
position would have refrained from asking or requesting any follow-up 
questions of Juror 27.  Id. at 56, 212 A.3d at 385.  Additionally, the court 
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found no other explanation for counsel’s motion to strike Juror 25 other than 
that counsel viewed Juror 27’s response to the crime victim question as a 
cause to strike.  Id. at 569, 212 A.3d at 385.  Altogether, the court determined 
that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.  Id. at 570, 212 A.3d at 385.  
     Next, while counsel’s performance was found to be deficient, the court 
could not conclude that counsel’s deficient performance in this case resulted 
in structural error.  Ramirez, 464 Md. at 573, 212 A.3d at 387-88.  Moreover, 
a claim of structural error would not relieve Ramirez’s burden to prove 
prejudice.  Id. at 573, 212 A.3d at 388.  The court again emphasized that a 
presumption of prejudice applies only in three limited circumstances and this 
case was not one of those circumstances.  Id. at 577, 212 A.3d at 390.  
Prejudice will not merely be presumed because the petitioner alleged that 
counsel’s performance resulted in structural error.  Id. at 575, 212 A.3d at 
389.  
     Ultimately, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided that Ramirez 
satisfied the performance prong, but not the prejudice prong.  Ramirez, 464 
Md. at 577, 212 A.3d at 390.  Specifically, the court concluded that Ramirez 
had failed to show that “there was a substantial or significant possibility that 
the verdicts were affected” by his counsel’s deficient performance.  Id. at 577, 
212 A.3d at 390 (quoting State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 86-87, 204 A.3d 139, 
154 (2019)).  The evidence presented by the State led to such strong 
conclusions that the court decided there was no possibility that the verdict 
would have been different had counsel moved to strike Juror 27.  Id. at 580, 
212 A.3d at 392.  Moreover, the jury did not submit any questions during 
deliberations and returned a verdict convicting Ramirez of all eleven charges 
within three hours.  Id. at 580, 212 A.3d at 392.  
     The dissent pronounced that the prejudice inquiry should rest on the 
fundamental fairness of the proceeding.  Ramirez, 464 Md. at 582, 212 A.3d 
at 393.  This opinion further argued that defective performance by counsel, 
which results in the presence of a biased individual on the jury, deprives a 
defendant of their constitutional right to a fair trial.  Id. at 583, 212 A.3d at 
394.  Accordingly, such performance that results in a fundamentally unfair 
trial is “prejudicial by definition.”  Id. at 583, 212 A.3d at 393.  
     In Ramirez, the Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that where 
counsel’s deficient performance may have resulted in the presence of a biased 
juror, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief still must show prejudice.  
This decision will ensure that every petitioner who claims a mistake by 
counsel will not automatically be entitled to a new trial.  The petitioner will 
have to show that counsel’s mistake had a substantial effect on the fair 
administration of justice in their case.  Though the dissent argues that this 
standard should not be used when a court is faced with deficient performance 
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that resulted in the presence of a biased juror, the fair administration of justice 
will not be threatened when the evidence presented by the State also strongly 
supports the resulting verdict.
